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This paper shows that the optimal monetary policies recommended by New Keynesian 
models still imply a large amount of inflation risk. We calculate the term structure of inflation 
uncertainty in New Keynesian models when the monetary authority adopts the optimal policy. 
When the monetary policy rules are modified to include some weight on a price path, the 
economy achieves equilibria with substantially lower long-run inflation risk. With either sticky 
prices or sticky wages, a price path target reduces the variance of inflation by an order of 




The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors.   1
I. Introduction 
Significant progress has been made in adapting modern macroeconomic models for use in 
policy analysis. Monetary economists have recently focused on determining the optimal 
monetary policy in New Keynesian models. This paper shows that optimal monetary policy in 
New Keynesian models produces a great deal of uncertainty about inflation at medium to long 
horizons. We show, however, that including some weight on a price path in the monetary policy 
rule substantially reduces long-run inflation variability regardless of the types of nominal 
rigidities. The source of nominal frictions does influence the impact that a price-path target has 
on output stabilization. In a New Keynesian model, however, a price-path target reduces long-
run inflation uncertainty by an order of magnitude more that it increases the variability of the 
output gap.  
An important distinction between New Keynesian models and reality is the relative 
importance of long-run inflation uncertainty. In New Keynesian models, long-run inflation 
uncertainty is typically not, by itself, a source of welfare loss. Policymakers, on the other hand, 
closely monitor long-term interest rates because they reflect expectations about future policy.  
Investors pay to insure against long-run risks. Although the fundamental risk that concerns 
policymakers and investors may be about long-run real growth—as in Orphanides and Williams 
(2002), Bansal and Yaron (2004), or Ries (2005)—uncertainty about long-run inflation also 
matters.   
Uncertainty about long-run inflation is revealed in the variability of the term structure of 
interest rates. Gallmeyer et al. (2007) present evidence about the volatility of yields on U.S. 
Treasury securities across a term structure from 1 quarter to 10 years. They report that the 
standard deviation of yields at the short end of the term structure, for the first 4 or 5 quarters, is   2
about 1.9 percent at an annual rate since 1990.  The standard deviation of the 10-year Treasury 
yield is about 1.1 percent. Using U.S. data from the indexed bond market from 1997 to 2000, 
McCulloch and Kochin (2000) estimate that the volatility of the inflation premium is roughly 
twice that of the real interest rate across the term structure. The purpose of our paper is not to 
model the reason why this long-run inflation uncertainty matters.  Rather, it is to evaluate the 
relative effects of alternative monetary policy rules on uncertainty.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes a general model. 
Section III discusses the calibration assumptions that are common to all the models and the 
assumptions about nominal rigidities that distinguish among them. Section IV shows how the 
New Keynesian models behave as policymakers approach the optimal policy. We also examine 
the effect of the policy rules on long-run uncertainty about expected inflation. In Section V, we 
analyze the consequences of price-path targeting for short-run output and inflation variability as 
well as for long-run inflation uncertainty. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. The  Model   
A New Keynesian model is developed in this paper that nests the three alternative 
versions: a flexible model, a sticky-price model, and a sticky-wage model. The three versions 
share many common features: the utility function, specification for money, and policy rule. They 
all have distortions associated with monopolistic competition in both the goods and labor 
markets. Modest investment adjustment costs are included to keep the real effects of policy from 
having too large an impact in the sticky-price and sticky-wage models. Our model includes 
exogenous disturbances to the monetary policy rule, preferences, and technology. As in Ireland 
(2005), the monetary policy shocks comprise both highly persistent shocks to the inflation target   3
and less persistent liquidity shocks to the short-term interest rate. This section outlines a dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium model with both sticky prices and sticky wages, but then indicates 
the calibrations that convert the price- and wage-setting rules into flexible specifications. 
Households: Each household is an infinitely lived agent who participates in state-
contingent securities markets. That assumption enables households to be homogenous with 
respect to consumption investment, capital, money, and bonds. Household h values consumption, 
ct, and real money balances, (Mt/Pt), but dislikes labor. Those preferences are summarized by the 
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Et is the conditional expectation at time t and β is the discount factor. The preference parameter, 
at, resembles an aggregate demand shock and evolves such that 
, ) ln( ) ln( , 1 t a t a t a a υ ρ + = −  
where 0 ≤ ρa < 1 and υa,t ~ N(0, σ
2
a). 
Households are monopolistically competitive suppliers of differentiated labor services to 
firms. Total labor hours utilized by the firms, nt, is calculated as a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) 
continuum of labor hours, nt,h, supplied by each household,  [0,1]: h∈   
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where –εw is the wage elasticity of demand for household h’s labor services. Cost minimization 















where Wh,t is the nominal wage rate of household h and Wt is interpreted as the aggregate 














⎣⎦ ∫  
  Households own the capital, kt, in this economy and supply it to the firms. Every period, 
household h chooses a level of investment, it, such that: 
, ) / ( 1 t t t t t t k k k i k k δ φ − = − +  
where  ) (⋅ φ is a functional form for capital adjustment costs and δ is the depreciation rate. The 
functional form,  ), (⋅ φ  represents capital adjustment costs in the manner of Hayashi (1982), where 
the resources lost in the conversion of investment to capital equals  . ) / ( t t i t k k i i φ −   Those lost 
resources are an increasing and convex function of the steady-state investment-to-capital ratio, 
such that  0 ) ( > ⋅ ′ φ  and  . 0 ) ( < ⋅ ′ ′ φ    
Household h begins each period with an initial level of nominal money balances, Mt-1, 
and receives a payment, Rt-1Bt-1, from its nominal bond holdings, Bt-1, where Rt is the gross 
nominal interest rate earned on bonds during period t. During the period, household h receives 
labor income, Wh,tnh,t; dividends from the firms, Dt; a lump-sum transfer from the monetary 
authority, Tt; a payment from the state contingent securities markets, Ah,t; and rental income from 
capital, Ptqtkt, where qt is the real rental rate of capital. Those resources then are used to fund   5
consumption and investment purchases and end-of-the-period bond, Bt, and money, Mt, holdings. 
The budget constraint for household h is represented as follows: 
,, 11 1 , () . tt t t t h t h tt t t t t t t t h t B Pc i M W n P q k D R B T M A −− − ++ + = + + + + ++  
Finally, household h chooses a level of ct, it, kt, Bt, and Mt that maximizes its expected utility 
subject to its capital accumulation and budget constraint equations. 
Wage contracts between households and firms can last for multiple periods. As a result, 
household h must determine each period whether or not an opportunity exists to negotiate a new 
nominal wage, Wh,t, for its labor services, nh,t. Using the Calvo (1983) model of random 
adjustment, the probability that household h can set a new nominal wage, W
*
t, is ηw, and the 
probability that its nominal wage can rise only by the steady-state inflation rate, π, is (1 – ηw). 
The nominal wage is perfectly flexible in this specification when ηw is set equal to 1. When 
household h has a wage-adjustment opportunity, it selects a nominal wage which maximizes its 
utility given the firms’ demand for its labor:  
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where (1 – ηw)
i is the probability that household h will not have an opportunity to negotiate a 
new nominal wage in the subsequent i periods.  
Firms:  Firms, owned by the households, are monopolistically competitive producers of 
differentiated goods. Firm f hires labor, nf,t, and rents capital, kf,t, from the households to produce 
its output, yf,t, according to a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
(1 )
,, , () (), ft t ft ft yZ k n
α α − =    6
where Zt is an economy-wide productivity factor and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The productivity factor, Zt, 
evolves such that 
1, ln( ) ln( ) (1 )ln( ) , tZt Z Z t ZZ Z ρ ρυ − =+ − +  
where 0 ≤ ρZ < 1, Z is the steady-state value of Zt, and υZ,t ~ N(0, σ
2
Z). 
Aggregate output, yt, is a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) continuum of differentiated products: 













⎣⎦ ∫  
where –εp is the price elasticity of demand for good f. Cost minimization by households yields 





























⎣⎦ ∫  
Every period, firm f utilizes the combination of labor and capital that minimizes its 
production costs,  ,, , tf t tf t wn qk +  given the production function. The first-order conditions from 
firm f’s cost minimization yield the following factor demand equations:  
(1 )
,, (/) tt t f t f t qZ n k
α ψα
− =  
,, /( 1 ) ( / ) , tt t t f t f t WP Zk n
α ψα =−  
where ψt is the Lagrange multiplier on the cost minimization problem and is interpreted as the 
real marginal cost of producing an additional unit of output. Furthermore, ψt is identical for all 
firms because every firm pays the same per unit capital and labor costs and has an equal measure 
of productivity, Zt.   7
Firm f also determines each period whether or not the price, Pf,t, for its product, yf,t, can 
be adjusted. Using the Calvo (1983) model of random adjustment, the probability that firm f can 
set a new price, P
*
t, is ηp, and the probability it can only adjust its price by the steady-state 
inflation rate, π, is (1 – ηp). Prices in this specification become perfectly flexible when ηp is set 
equal to 1. When a firm can set a new price, it selects a price that maximizes the discounted 
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i is the households’ real value in period t of an additional unit of profits in period t+i 
and (1 – ηp)
i is the probability that the firm will not have an opportunity to set a new price in the 
subsequent i periods.  
The Monetary Authority:  Monetary policy operates with an interest rate rule. 
Specifically, the monetary authority utilizes a generalized Taylor (1993) rule. The policy rule is 
defined by the following equations: 
** *
, ln( / ) ln( / ) ln( / ) ln( / ) ln( / ) , tt t t d W t t P t R t R R dW dW P P π π πθ π π θ θ ε =+ + + +  
where π
*
t is the target inflation rate, dWt is the nominal wage inflation rate, 
*
t dW is the nominal 
wage-inflation target, and , Rt ε  is a transitory monetary policy shock in which ,, 1 , Rt R Rt Rt ε ρε ν − =+ , 
) , 0 ( ~
2
, R t R N σ ν . Variables without time subscripts are steady-state values. The steady-state price 
inflation is equal to the steady-state wage inflation because there is no trend in the real wage. 
Whether the central bank has a target for price inflation or wage inflation, we assume a common   8
functional form for the target-setting process (i.e.,
* *
t t dW π = ), so that we limit the discussion to 
the target-setting process for price inflation. The target follows a common stochastic AR(1) 
process such that:  
**
1, ln( / ) ln( / ) , tt t ππ π πρππ ν − =+  
where 
2
, ~( 0 ,) . t N ππ ν σ  Assuming a common stochastic process for the price- and wage-inflation 
targets allows us to model policy uncertainty in a symmetric manner.  
The inflation target shock and the transitory monetary policy shock have similar effects 
on the nominal interest rate, except for the differences in their persistence.
1 The target shock is to 
the long-run inflation objective, while the transitory shock is to short-run liquidity. The monetary 
authority in the model has a credible long-run inflation target equal to the steady-state inflation 
rate, but the actual target rate may deviate from the steady state for an extended period.  
In our model, the monetary authority has full credibility, which enables agents to 
distinguish between persistent shocks to the inflation target and temporary shocks to the liquidity 
position. That assumption is clearly realistic for cases such as the Fed’s short-run responses to 
the 1987 stock market crash and the September 11 attacks. The absence of an explicit inflation 
target in the United States, however, likely causes some confusion between these two shocks, 
especially in the Fed’s reaction to news about the state of the economy.  
 
                                                 
1 The equivalence of the inflation target shock and the liquidity shock depends on the calibrated values of  π θ  or 
. dW θ  In general, if the weight on inflation is equal to 2 and both shocks have the same persistence, then an 
expansionary shock to the inflation policy has the same effect as an expansionary shock to liquidity.  
   9
III.  Calibrating the Model 
Most of the parameter calibrations that we use are taken from characteristics of the U.S. 
data and/or have been widely used in the literature. In the utility function, the value of σ1 is set at 
1/3 implying that the elasticity of the labor supply with respect to the real wage is equal to 3. The 
value of σ2 is set at 1/2, implying that the interest elasticity of money demand is equal to –1/2. 
The steady-state labor share is 0.3 and the discount factor is 0.99. The capital share of output is 
set to 0.33 and the capital stock depreciates at 2.5 percent per quarter. The average and marginal 
capital adjustment costs around the steady state are zero (i.e.,  k i/ ) ( = ⋅ φ  and  ). 1 ) ( = ⋅ ′ φ   The 
elasticity of the investment-to-capital ratio with respect to Tobin’s q, 
1 )] ( / ) ( ) / [(
− ⋅ ′ ⋅ ′ ′ = φ φ χ k i , is 
set to 5.  
Large autocorrelation coefficients for the technology and preference shocks  95 . 0 ( = Z ρ  
and ) 90 . 0 = a ρ  imply a high level of persistence. The standard deviation of the technology 
shock, Z σ , is set equal to 0.005, which is consistent with the lower volatility of output observed 
since 1984. The standard deviation of the preference shock, a σ , is set equal to 0.01, which is 
consistent with Ireland (2005), who estimates that the preference shock is twice as large (in 
standard deviation) as the technology shock. 
The parameters determining the effect of nominal rigidities are consistent with previous 
studies by Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), Keen (2004), 
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), Ireland (2005), and Levin et al. (2005). The price 
elasticity of demand is set equal to 6, implying a steady-state markup of 20 percent. This 
assumption is consistent with Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and 
Evans (2005). We set the probability of price adjustment equal to 1 for the flexible-price case 
and equal to 0.25 for the sticky-price case which implies that firms change prices on average   10
once a year. We follow Levin et al. (2005) in setting the wage elasticity of labor demand equal to 
6, implying a steady-state markup of 20 percent.
2 The probability of price adjustment is set equal 
to 1 for the flexible wage case and equal to 0.25 for the sticky-wage case.  
In our view, there are two important sources of uncertainty in U.S. policymaking that 
correspond to liquidity and inflation target shocks. We calibrate the liquidity shock to follow an 
AR(1) process with a first-order autocorrelation coefficient of 0.3 and a standard deviation of 
0.002. This uncertainty may be due to the Fed’s practice of making discrete changes in the 
interest rate. That practice causes a stochastic difference between the model’s implied target and 
the actual target. Dueker (2000), in a study of the prime rate, used a dynamic ordered probit 
model to estimate the spread between the banking system’s desired prime rate and the actual 
prime rate when changes are discrete. Using data from 1974-1999, Dueker estimates that the 
spread follows a first-order AR(1) process with an autocorrelation coefficient equal to 0.37 and a 
standard deviation of 26 basis points. Since the prime rate has been closely linked to the federal 
funds rate, the difference between the prime rate and this latent variable should be a good proxy 
for the error induced into policy by the FOMC’s practice of making discrete policy changes. 
In recent years, FOMC members have stated inflation target preferences ranging from 1 
to 3 percent. The lack of an explicit target suggests that the perceived target inflation rate is 
stochastic. We set the steady-state annual inflation rate at 2 percent and assume that a shock to 
the target inflation rate has a first-order autocorrelation coefficient equal to 0.95 and a quarterly 
standard deviation of 0.125 percent. Under that specification, a 95 percent confidence interval 
approximates an informal annual target range of 0.5 to 3.5 percent in the flexible price model. 
 
                                                 
2 Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), on the other hand, estimate a much smaller wage markup.   11
 
IV.  Evaluating Monetary Policy 
The optimal monetary policy in New Keynesian models depends on the source of the 
nominal rigidity. King and Wolman (1999) and Woodford (2003) show that targeting price 
inflation is optimal monetary policy in a sticky-price framework. Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba 
(2004), on the other hand, find that monetary policy should target wage inflation when wages are 
sticky. Given those results, we evaluate both a price-inflation-targeting rule in a sticky-price 
model and a wage-inflation-targeting rule in sticky-wage model. We begin by examining the 
effect of alternative policies on the variability of the output gap and inflation.  
Optimal Policy with No Policy Shocks. Levin et al. (2005) maintain that policy shocks to 
the inflation target or the liquidity position are not beneficial and, as a result, the monetary 
authority eliminates them when conducting optimal policy. Beginning with that assumption, we 
set the variances of the policy shocks to zero. The weights on inflation deviations from target 
range from 1.1 to 5. To determine the standard deviation of the output gap and the annual 
inflation rate, we perform 5,000 simulations on a sample set of 260 quarters of data where the 
first 100 quarters are discarded to randomize the initial conditions. 
We assume that the monetary authority follows a price-inflation-targeting rule in the 
sticky-price model and a wage-inflation targeting rule in the sticky-wage model. Figure 1 shows 
the variance of the output gap (upper panels) and the annual inflation rate (lower panels) as the 
weight on price inflation, θπ, changes in the sticky-price model (left column) and as the weight 
on wage inflation, θdW, varies in the sticky-wage model (right column). The results without 
policy shocks are shown with a solid line. The figure illustrates that, in the absence of policy 
shocks, the variance of the output gap and inflation is nearly zero in the sticky-price model when   12
θπ is above 3. When θdW equals 3 or more in the sticky-wage model, the variance of the output 
gap is less than 0.5 percent and the variance of inflation is slightly above 3.5 percent at an annual 
rate.
3 
Optimal Policy with Policy Shocks. We now modify our analysis by adding the 
assumption that both inflation target shocks and liquidity shocks are present in the economy. In 
the United States, the Federal Reserve follows a strategy that leads to both the inflation target 
shocks and liquidity shocks. The absence of a numerical inflation objective creates uncertainty 
about the Fed’s inflation target.
4 Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2003) show that the inflation 
premium in forward interest rates responds significantly to macroeconomic news, which they 
attribute to the absence of an explicit inflation target. Using a learning model, Orphanides and 
Williams (2005) show that uncertainty about the inflation objective can lead to sizable 
fluctuations in the long-term inflation outcome. Hence, inflation target shocks are the 
unintentional consequence of having a vague inflation objective. Liquidity shocks are also 
inadvertently introduced into the U.S. economy by the FOMC’s practice of adjusting the federal 
funds rate in 25-basis-point increments.  
The dashed lines in Figure 1 replicate the experiments described in the previous 
subsection—this time including policy shocks. The introduction of policy shocks raises the 
variability of the output gap and inflation in both models. In a sticky-price economy, the variance 
of the output gap increases from near zero to 0.2 percent and the variance of the annual inflation 
rate climbs from near zero to 2.0 percent when θπ is 3 or more. Similarly, the variance of the 
output gap rises from less than 0.1 percent to 0.3 percent and the variance of the annual inflation 
                                                 
3 We also experimented with an output term in the policy rule. In general, the optimal weight on output is zero if the 
reaction coefficient on price or wage inflation is 3 or more. 
4 See Ireland (2005) for a historical analysis of the Fed’s unobserved inflation objective. Also, see Kozicki and 
Tinsley (2005) for estimates of these policy shocks.   13
rate escalates by more than 2 percentage points to 6.0 percent when wages are sticky and θdW is 3 
or higher.   
The Term Structure of Uncertainty with Inflation Targeting. Monetary policymakers are 
concerned about the consequences of their policy actions on expectations embedded in the 
longer-term bond market. Although our model does not contain the features needed to examine 
this issue fully, we report the impact of alternative policy rules on the volatility of inflation and 
the output gap over a term structure ranging from one to ten years. We do not consider the 
covariance between inflation and the output gap. In Figure 2, the coefficient on the price-
inflation target or wage-inflation target is set to 3. By starting at the steady state and shocking the 
exogenous variables, we simulate 10 years of data over 5,000 times to obtain a distribution of the 
average annual inflation rates and output gaps over 1- through 10-year horizons. This experiment 
enables us to address the question, “How does the monetary policy rule affect the distribution of 
future inflation and the output gap over the next 10 years?”  
The upper panels in Figure 2 show the distribution of the standard deviation of the 
average annual inflation rates over 1- through 10-year horizons in both models with and without 
the policy shocks. The results indicate that policy shocks are an important source of inflation 
uncertainty. In the sticky-price model, the standard deviation of the annual inflation rate is near 
0.15 percent at all forecast horizons without policy shocks. Adding policy shocks to that model 
raises the standard deviation of inflation by about 0.5 percentage points at a 1-year forecast 
horizon and about 0.75 percentage points after 5 years. In the sticky-wage model, the non-policy 
shocks create more inflation uncertainty than in the sticky-price specification, especially at short-
term horizons. The standard deviation of inflation is 0.88 percent at a 1-year forecast horizon but 
falls to 0.30 percent at 10-year horizon. Policy shocks create additional inflation uncertainty at   14
all horizons in the sticky-wage specification. They increase the standard deviation of inflation by 
0.25 percentage points at a 1- year horizon and by 0.7 percentage points at a 10-year horizon. 
The lower panels in Figure 2 show the distribution of the standard deviation of the 
average output gap over 1- through 10-year horizons in both models with and without the policy 
shocks. The results indicate that policy shocks are an important source of uncertainty in the 
output gap in the near term, but the long-term uncertainty, as measured in Figure 2, reflects the 
averaging of the higher output gap variability in the first few years. In the sticky-price model, the 
standard deviation of the output gap is less than .025 percent at all forecast horizons without 
policy shocks. Adding policy shocks to this model raises the standard deviation of the output gap 
by a factor of 5 at all horizons. In the sticky-wage model, the non-policy shocks create more 
variability in the output gap than in the sticky-price specification, but the addition of policy 
shocks only increases the relative variability of the output gap by a factor of about 1-1/2 at all 
horizons. 
 
V.   Price-path targeting  
Several authors, beginning with Svensson (1999), have shown that price-path targeting 
by the monetary authority improves the tradeoff between output and inflation variability. The 
term “price-path targeting” rather than “price-level targeting” recognizes the possibility that the 
price target can grow over time. The critical point is that the price level follows a deterministic, 
not a stochastic, trend. Our price-path target is equivalent to imposing a long-run inflation target 
on the monetary policy rule. Furthermore, Dittmar and Gavin (2005) find that a small weight on 
the price level (i.e., θP > 0) enables a model to generate a unique solution with calibrated values 
of less than one for the price-inflation target, θπ, and wage-inflation target, θdW.    15
Figure 3 displays the optimal weight on the price-path target, θP, given two baseline  
weights on the the price-inflation target, θπ, and wage-inflation target, θdW . We set θπ to 3, which 
is the value used in Figure 2, and θdW  equal to1, which is a value that we found to work well 
when a price-path target is included in the policy rule. The upper panels show how the variance 
of the output gap changes as θP is increased from 0.01 to 0.5. When prices are sticky, a higher 
value for θπ generates lower output gap variance when θP is less than 0.4. In the sticky wage 
model, a policy rule with θdW  equal to 3 produces a relatively high, but fairly constant output 
variability over the range of values for θP. The overall variability in the output gap, however, is 
lower in the sticky wage model when θdW  is set to 1 and its minimum variance occurs when θP  
equals 0.1. The lower panels of Figure 3 show how the variance of inflation depends on θP. In 
both policy rules for both models, the variability of inflation declines monotonically as θP 
increases, but models with lower values for θπ and θdW  generate less output gap movement if θP 
is 0.05 or larger. 
The optimal monetary policy rule depends on the source or sources of nominal rigidities 
and the policymaker’s preferences. If the policymaker either believes that the economy is 
characterized by sticky prices and not sticky wages, or only cares about inflation, then the 
optimal policy in our model would be to put an infinite weight on the price level, θP.  If, on the 
other hand, the nominal rigidity is in wage setting, then a higher value for θP generates a lower 
variance in inflation but a higher variance in the output gap.  
Figure 4 examines the variances of the output gap and the annual inflation rate when a 
price-path target is combined with a price- or wage-inflation target. For these simulations the 
weight on the price path, θP, is set to 0.2. This choice balances concern about the effect on the   16
output gap when wages are sticky with concern about inflation variability in all cases.
5  We 
restrict our analysis to models with policy shocks. For the purpose of comparison, we reproduce 
the case with policy shocks and no price-path target in Figure 4. Following the computation 
procedure from Figure 1, the variances of the output gap and inflation are calculated for values 
of θπ and θdW between 0.1 and 5 in the sticky-price model and the sticky-wage model, 
respectively. The left column of Figure 4 shows that the introduction of a price-path target in the 
sticky-price specification substantially reduces the variability of inflation while only slightly 
increasing movements in the output gap. The variance of inflation is minimized at only 0.14 
percent when θπ equals 1. That inflation variance is considerably smaller than the 2 percent 
generated when θπ is 3 or more and the price path is not targeted. The output gap, on the other 
hand, is only 0.08 percentage points higher when the price path is targeted and θπ is set to 1, than 
it is with no price-path target and a value of θπ equal to 3. 
The right column of Figure 4 reveals that a price-path target in the sticky-wage model 
also reduces inflation movements but increases variability in the output gap. Those results are 
qualitatively the same as in the sticky-price model. Inflation variance is minimized with a value 
of θdW  below 1, but the output gap variance still falls rather sharply until θdW  goes above 1. 
Setting θdW equal to 1 generates a variance of about 2 percent in the annual inflation rate which is 
about 4 percentage points lower than the minimum variance without a price-path target. This 
policy setting generates a variance of the output gap that is about 0.2 percentage points higher 
than the case with no price-path target and a value of θdW greater than 3. Thus, introducing a 
price-path target in a sticky-wage model also generates a tradeoff between lower inflation 
variability and higher output gap variability. 
                                                 
5 Our choice would be optimal in the loss function presented later in this section if the weight on the output gap were 
3 to 4 times the weight on inflation. As the weight on the output gap is reduced, the optimal value of θP rises.   17
Understanding the policy implications of this tradeoff between output and inflation 
variability requires using a welfare metric to evaluate the alternative policy rules. We know from 
Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2004), that optimal policy in our particular versions of the New 
Keynesian model can be achieved by eliminating policy shocks and putting an infinite weight on 
the inflation target. We are addressing the case where such a policy is not feasible. Walsh (1998), 
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), Woodford (2002), and others argue that the optimal monetary 
policy in a New Keynesian model can be approximated by minimizing a loss function (L) that is 
quadratic in inflation and the output gap.  Consider the following form: 
ˆˆ ˆ var(4 ) var( )
f
tt t Ly y πλ =× + × − , 
where  ˆ var(4 ) t π × is the unconditional variance of the annualized inflation rate,  ) ˆ ˆ var(
f
t t y y − is the 
unconditional variance of output from its flexible price and wage equilibrium, and λ  measures 
the weight on the output gap in the loss function such that  [0, ). λ ∈ ∞   Disagreement exists on 
the appropriate calibration of  . λ  Rotemberg and Woodford’s (1997) estimates imply a value for 
λ of 0.05, while Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), Williams (2003), and others argue that equal 
weight on inflation and the output gap (i.e.,  1.0) λ =  is consistent with stabilization objectives.  
Using this loss function, we can rank alternative policy rules and consider differing values of λ.  
Our results suggest that targeting the price path and setting θπ or θdW  equal to 1 is 
preferable to having no price-path target as long as the loss function parameter λ is not too large. 
In the sticky-price case, comparing the policy rule ( , ) (3,0) P π θ θ = with the policy rule 
( , ) (1,0.2) P π θ θ = , we find that the second rule is preferred for all values of λ less than 24.7. In 
the case with sticky wages, comparing the policy rule ( , ) (3,0) dW P θ θ = with the policy rule   18
( , ) (1,0.2) dW P θ θ = , we find that the rule that puts weight on the price path is preferred for all 
values of λ less than 21.9.  
Svensson (1999) shows that there is less short-run inflation variability with a price level 
target than with an inflation target if there is moderate persistence in output. The reason is seen 
by evaluating the determination of inflation variance in each regime. In an inflation targeting 
regime, the variance of inflation depends on the variance of the output gap. In a price level 
targeting regime, the variance of inflation depends on the variance of the difference in the output 
gap. With a realistic calibration of the model, there is a high degree of persistence in output and 
the variance of the first difference of the output gap is less that the variance of the output gap 
itself.  
The Term Structure of Inflation and Output Gap Expectations with Price-path targeting.  
The upper panels in Figure 5 display the impact of a price-path target on the standard deviation 
of the average annual inflation rate across the term structure of maturities from 1 to 10 years. As 
in Figures 3 and 4, we restrict our investigation to models with policy shocks. In the top left 
panel of Figure 5, the effect of three alternative monetary policy rules on the variability of 
expected inflation is examined in a sticky-price specification. The baseline specification with 
policy shocks from Figure 2 assumes there is no price-path target (θP = 0) and θπ equal to 3. In 
comparison, adding a price-path target (θP = 0.2) to the policy rule greatly reduces the inflation 
uncertainty caused by the policy shocks. Furthermore, recall from Figure 4 that inflation 
variability is further reduced when the price path is targeted and θπ is set closer to 1. This policy 
rule specification eliminates most of the inflation variability induced by the policy shocks and 
even removes some of the variation caused by non-policy shocks at both the short and long ends 
of the term structure.    19
The top right panel of Figure 5 displays the effects of the same three alternative monetary 
policy rules on expected inflation movements in a sticky-wage model. The outcome in this 
specification is also qualitatively similar to the result in the sticky-price model. The addition of a 
price-path target (θP = 0.2) to a wage-inflation-targeting rule (θdW = 3.0) basically eliminates the 
uncertainty about future inflation produced by the policy shocks. By lowering θdW  to 1 with a 
price-path target, monetary policy can also reduce the inflation uncertainty caused by non-policy 
shocks over the entire term structure. 
The intuition underlying the findings for inflation uncertainty in Figure 5 is 
straightforward:  Adjusting the nominal interest rate target in response to the inflation rate allows 
the price level to deviate permanently from its expected path. Greater variation in actual inflation 
pushes the price level further from its expected path and increases long-run inflation uncertainty. 
A small weight on the price path, however, ensures that the price level will converge toward a 
deterministic trend over time, which has the effect of lowering the variability of long-run 
inflation. Although inflation uncertainty is reduced at all horizons in regimes with a target for a 
price path, Figure 5 shows that the relative reduction in inflation uncertainty in a regime with a 
price path is much greater at longer horizons than at shorter ones.  
  The lower panels in Figure 5 display the impact of a price-path target on the standard 
deviation of the expected output gap across the term structure of maturities from 1 to 10 years. In 
the bottom left panel, most of the output gap variation in the sticky-price model is concentrated 
in the first 2 years. The average standard deviation of the output gap over longer horizons 
declines monotonically and mainly reflects the averaging of the higher variability in the near 
term. In the bottom right panel, we show that adding a price-path target to the sticky-wage model 
has the same qualitative impact on output gap movements as in the sticky-price specification, but   20
its quantitative effect is larger. Intuitively, output gap movements decline over time in both 
models as more firms and households are able to adjust their prices or wages.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
The optimal monetary policy in New Keynesian models depends on the source of 
nominal rigidity. When prices are sticky, it is optimal to stabilize price inflation, whereas it is 
optimal to stabilize wage inflation when wages are sticky. This article shows that, in both cases, 
the optimal policy generates a relatively large amount of uncertainty about long-run inflation.  
By placing some weight on a deterministic price path, a central bank can reduce the long-
run inflation uncertainty. A price-path target eliminates most variation in long-run inflation 
caused by monetary policy shocks and even reduces long-run inflation movements generated by 
non-policy shocks in the sticky-wage specification. This policy induces a small increase in the 
variability of the output gap but a much larger reduction in inflation variability. Social welfare, 
as measured by a Woodford (2003) style loss function, rises with a price-path target in the 
monetary policy rule except when the weight on the output gap in the loss function is extremely 
high.  
Our results suggest two important topics for future research. First, the effect of long-run 
inflation risk on social welfare needs to be explicitly modeled. Second, we need to understand 
whether wage stickiness characterizes modern economies and, if it does, why central banks do 
not target wage inflation as theory suggests.   21
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Figure 1: Optimal Monetary Policy: The Impact of Policy Shocks
Without policy shocks








Sticky price model: Price inflation targeting rule











































Sticky wage model: Wage inflation targeting rule



































Figure 2: Long-Run Inflation and Output Uncertainty: The Impact of Policy Shocks







Sticky price model: Price inflation targeting rule































Sticky wage model: Wage inflation targeting rule













































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Optimal Monetary Policy: The Impact of a Price Path Target
Without a price path target








Sticky price model: Price inflation targeting rule



































Sticky wage model: Wage inflation targeting rule



































Figure 5: Long-Run Inflation and Output Uncertainty: The Impact of a Price Path Target







Sticky price model: Price inflation targeting rule































Sticky wage model: Wage inflation targeting rule
Output gap forecast horizon in years
S
D
(
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
 
g
a
p
)
%
θ
P=0.0 and θ
π=3.0
θ
P=0.2 and θ
π=3.0
θ
P=0.2 and θ
π=1.0
θ
P=0.0 and θ
dW=3.0
θ
P=0.2 and θ
dW=3.0
θ
P=0.2 and θ
dW=1.0
θ
P=0.0 and θ
π=3.0
θ
P=0.2 and θ
π=3.0
θ
P=0.2 and θ
π=1.0
θ
P=0.0 and θ
dW=3.0
θ
P=0.2 and θ
dW=3.0
θ
P=0.2 and θ
dW=1.0